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We stand upon the brink of a precipice.  We peer into the abyss—we grow sick and dizzy… there grows into palpability, a shape, far more terrible than any genie, or any demon of a tale, and yet it is but a thought, although a fearful one, and one which chills the very marrow of our bones with the fierceness of the delight of its horror.  It is merely the idea of what would be our sensations during the sweeping precipitancy of a fall from such a height.  And this fall… for the very reason that involves that one most ghastly and loathsome of all the most ghastly and loathsome of images of death and suffering which have ever presented themselves to our imagination—for this very cause do we now the most vividly want it.

Edgar Allen Poe, “The Imp of the Perverse”​[1]​
I.	Introduction: Poe and Perversity
In some ways, there is nothing odd about Poe’s precipice-dweller: there is something that he wants to do and he wants to do it for some reason.​[2]​  It is tempting to insist that he must think that there is something good about jumping to the rocks below, but Poe’s description of him suggests otherwise: rather, it suggests that the precipice-dweller’s reason for jumping is tied up with its being ghastly and loathsome—for that very cause does he want to jump.  Just how to understand agents like Poe’s precipice-dweller is not altogether clear; he is certainly a puzzling character.   But according to the two dogmas of moral psychology, he is not even possible so-described.  Of course, agents rather like him might be imagined; perhaps Poe’s remarkable agent is attracted to falling to the rocks below in the same way that many of us are attracted to roller coasters or scary movies.  But the interesting question is not whether he can be re-described, but rather whether he is possible as Poe and I describe him.  
If so, Poe’s precipice-dweller is a counter-example to the two dogmas of moral psychology. Very roughly, the first dogma asserts that we can only desire what we think is good, while the second asserts that we can act intentionally only if we think that there is something good about that action or its consequences. Both have enviable historical pedigrees.  The first dogma recalls Kant’s “old formula of the schools”—the view that “We desire nothing except under the form of the good”​[3]​—and Aquinas’ thesis that “people desire things because they think them good” ​[4]​ Aristotle seems to endorse something like the second dogma when he claims that “every action and decision, seems to seek some good; that is why some people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks.”​[5]​  However, the present popularity of the two dogmas is in some dispute.  Almost thirty years ago, Michael Stocker declared that “It is hardly unfair… to suggest that the philosophical view is overwhelmingly that the good or only the good attracts”—that the philosophical consensus was that first dogma was true.​[6]​  Under Stocker’s influence, no small number of philosophers have come to reject the first dogma, enough that one scholar declares that “Most philosophers accept that we do not necessarily desire the good.”​[7]​  Whether the two dogmas are the status quo is an open empirical question, but it can hardly be doubted that some of our best philosophers endorse one or both of them.​[8]​  As such, it is certainly appropriate to re-examine the two dogmas and consider their defensibility.  
In what follows, I consider two different arguments that proponents of the two dogmas have offered in their support.  In section II, I attempt to get clear about the content of the two dogmas; in particular, I explain what the two dogmas cannot be.  In section III I discuss the oft-considered phenomenon of desiring the bad.  While some philosophers have appealed directly to the possibility of desiring the bad to demonstrate that the first dogma is false, I shall take up a different strategy.  In sections IV and VI, I consider two arguments—“the Argument from Appeal” and “the Argument from Intelligibility,” respectively—that some proponents of the two dogmas have advanced.  In sections V and VII, I argue that each argument is unsound.  Worse, I argue in the penultimate section VIII that reflection on the Argument from Intelligibility suggests that the second dogma is false.  I also argue that the first dogma is false because the second dogma is. 

II.	The Two Dogmas
The following are the bare minimum that must be accepted to endorse the two dogmas:
SD1): Necessarily, an agent, A, can want some object or event, D, only if A thinks that D is good (in some aspect)
SA1): Necessarily, an agent, A, can intentionally perform some action, , only if A thinks that ing is good (in some aspect)​[9]​  
Some clarifications are in order.  First, it should go without saying that ‘good’ is ambiguous.  If SD1) and SA1) are interesting at all, there must be a substantive sense of ‘good’ being employed here.  Perhaps everyone can agree that desires must have an aim, that the satisfaction of a desire requires that some object or event is realized; if SD1) and SA1) only require that, they are rather trivial theses.​[10]​  Certainly neither requires that an agent thinks that D or ing is morally good; at least, experience strongly suggests that SD1) and SA1) are false if ‘good’ is understood in that sense.  Beyond that, clarifying just what the substantive non-moral sense of ‘good’ is supposed to be is tricky.
Second, SD1) and SA1) only require that an agent thinks that the relevant propositional object is good (in some aspect), not that she believes it to be so.  Proponents of the two dogmas have suggested variously that desiring is conceiving something to be good from some evaluative perspective,​[11]​ that what is desired must in some way be seen as good,​[12]​ and that the object of desire must seem to be good.​[13]​  But an agent who conceives that P or sees that P or whatever need not thereby believe that P although conceiving that P, seeing that P, and so forth are cognitive states akin to believing.  The term ‘thinking' as I shall use it is a term of art that includes belief in its scope, but also other cognitive states that are merely belief-like.
	Another complication requires more attention. We very rarely explain that we want something because we conceive it to be good; rather, we explain that we want to hold onto old photos for sentimental reasons, that we want the tuna because it is tasty, and so forth.  This fact threatens to complicate Kant’s old formula of the schools and Aquinas’ thesis.  Consider Warren Quinn’s discussion of desire and its role in the production and explanation of action:
…a non-cognitive dispositive functional state… cannot ground reasons for action.  What does that is another element (of necessity) typically present in basic desire, namely, some kind of evaluation of the desired object as good—for example, pleasant, interesting, advantageous, stature-enhancing, as decent.​[14]​
Quinn appears to endorse something like SD1) insofar as he claims that, of necessity, we typically evaluate the object of desire as good.  But in the next breath, he suggests that evaluating the object of desire as pleasant is (or at least suffices) to evaluate it as good.  And that suggests that Quinn also endorses, not SD1), but a rather different variant of it.  Let ‘G’ denote any good-making property—that is, any property that makes its bearer good in some aspect when instantiated. Quinn appears to be sympathetic with the following:
SD2): Necessarily, an agent, A, can want D only if A thinks that D is G (where G is some good-making property)
Unlike SD1), SD2) does not imply that a desiderative attitude for D depends upon a cognitive state with the content that D is good.  Rather, SD2) only requires that A is in some cognitive state with the content that D is pleasant or interesting or whatever.  Proponents of the two dogmas have reason to embrace SD2) since, as Quinn seems to recognize, it is closer to the truth concerning why we want much of what we want.  The problem is that SD2) has implications that are unacceptable to philosophers like Quinn.  Even if being pleasurable is actually a good-making property, it is surely possible to think that something is pleasurable without also thinking that it is good in some aspect or even at all.  An ascetic monk who thinks that all sexual desires are the work of the devil might conclude that any pleasure derived from them is not the least bit good while acknowledging that sex is pleasurable.  Such a monk could desire in accord SD2) while denying that sex is good (in any aspect) and that seems inconsistent with Kant’s old formula.​[15]​  
If SD2) cannot be what proponents of the two dogmas have in mind, neither can the following:
SD3): Necessarily, an agent, A, can want D only if i) A thinks that D is G and ii) A thinks that all things that are G are good (in some aspect)
SD3) is essentially a conjunction of SD1) and SD2), implying that a desire for D requires both a cognitive state with the content that D is pleasurable, for example, and a cognitive state that anything pleasurable is good.  As such, SD3) blocks my monk as a counter-example since he only thinks that sex is pleasurable but not also that anything pleasurable is good.  But SD3) is problematic.  Admittedly, a rather simple bit of syllogistic reasoning reveals that sex is good if it is pleasurable and if everything pleasurable is good.  But suppose my monk is faced with the prospect of actually having sex for the first time and is distracted as a result; he might fail to draw the conclusion that sex is good from the relevant premises while still assenting to them.  As such, he could desire in accord with SD3) while still failing to conceive of sex as good (in any aspect) and that too seems inconsistent with Kant’s formula.  Admittedly, the monk may be patently irrational, but irrational desires are desires.
	If both SD2) nor SD3) are consistent with the result that an agent who wants D fails to think that D is good in some aspect, perhaps the following principle is needed:
SD4): Necessarily an agent, A, can want D only if A thinks i) that D is G, ii) A thinks that all things that are G are good (in some aspect), and iii) A infers (or otherwise think) that D is good in some aspect
SD4) surely over-intellectualizes desire and runs afoul of our common experiences of desiring.  Following Thomas Nagel, desires are either motivated or unmotivated: they are either the product of decision and deliberation or not.​[16]​  If SD4) is correct, then all desires are motivated and none of them unmotivated.  But surely that is implausible.  
	The challenge for proponents of the two dogmas, then, is to articulate a conception of desire that utilizes a non-trivial sense of ‘good’ that is both consistent with common facts about desiring and precludes cases of desiring that are presumably inconsistent with Kant’s old formula of the schools.  While success here is uncertain, I shall continue to suppose that SD1) and SA1) constitute the two dogmas precisely because they at least ward off the possibility of desiring in ways that are clearly at odds with Kant’s formula.​[17]​

III.	On Desiring the Bad
	As noted above, a number of philosophers came to question SD1) under Stocker’s influence, partly because Stocker seems to describe common enough cases in which agents desire the bad.  Getting clear about what desiring the bad amounts to helps to clarify just what accepting the two dogmas requires and, relatedly, what would suffice to show that they are false.  Initially, it will do to clarify what desiring the bad isn’t.
First, note that SD1) does not require that A thinks that D is good all-things considered or absolutely, only that she thinks it is good (in some aspect).  But that is consistent with desiring something that one knows is bad in some aspect or even bad all-things considered.​[18]​  Just as one can think that there is an oasis in the distance while judging that there could be no such thing, one can think that something is good (in some aspect) while knowing that it cannot be.  So, SD1) is consistent with the following:
DB1): An agent, A, can desire some object or event, D, and think that D is bad (in some aspect or all-things considered)
But if desiring the bad requires more than simply wanting D while thinking that D is bad, it does not require anything as extreme as wanting D because one thinks that D is bad—desiring perversely, as it were.  David Velleman considers a case of perverse desiring when he imagines an agent who wants to smash crockery just because it strikes him as a worthless thing to do: the crockery-smasher “desires things conceived as… bad, and desires them precisely under those descriptions.”​[19]​  If he thought that there was something worthwhile or otherwise good about smashing crockery, he would lose any desire to do so.​[20]​  So described, Velleman’s crockery-smasher can perversely desire to smash crockery only if the following is true:
DB2): An agent, A, can desire some object or event, D, even if i) A does not think that D is good (in some aspect or all-things considered), ii) A thinks that D is bad (in some aspect or all-things considered), and iii) A desires D because A thinks that D is bad (in some aspect or all-things considered)
The first clause of DB2) is crucial if cases of perverse desiring are supposed to be problematic.  Our reasons for acting might be over-determined; perhaps an agent acts because she thinks that smashing crockery is bad while also thinking that doing so is good (in some aspect), even though she does not act for that reason.  That sort of case is also consistent with SD1).  What is crucial for perverse desiring is that an agent wants what she thinks is bad because she thinks its bad—for precisely that reason—and SD1) is clearly false if perverse desiring is possible.
	No case against the two dogmas rests upon supposing that anyone desires perversely and only desires perversely.  In the following, Velleman discusses Satan from Milton’s Paradise Lost who utters the infamous imperative “Evil, be thou my Good”:
Satan is here resolving to desire and pursue evil, and hence—as he himself puts it—to regard evil as good.  But he cannot reasonably be interpreted as adopting new estimates of what’s valuable—that is, as resolving to cease judging evil to be evil and to start judging it to be good.  If Satan ever loses sight of he evil in what he now desires, if he ever comes to think of what he desires as really good, he will no longer be at all satanic; he’ll be just another well-intentioned fool.​[21]​
Perhaps Velleman’s Satan is puzzling; if Satan desires D because D is bad, we should expect that, ceteris paribus, he would think that other things that are bad are desirable, including turning down delicious ice cream and being punched in the face.  But however, perverse Satan is supposed to be, it is odd to suppose that he is that perverse.​[22]​  How exactly Milton’s Satan should be understood is an interesting question, but the present discussion does not depend on sorting that out.  DB2) only implies that perverse desiring is possible, not that agents with desire sets that are perverse through and through are.
Still, it might be objected that there is something at best puzzling and at worst incoherent about perverse desiring, especially to proponents of SD1) can be divided into at least two categories: those who think—like Aquinas—that agents want D because they think that D is good.  Aquinas-style proponents of SD1) seem to embrace the thesis that wanting D amounts to wanting D for a reason—perhaps that is what the claim that agents want things because they are pleasant or interesting or whatever amounts to.  What reasons are is a disputed matter, but on some accounts of things, there is a reason for wanting D only if there is some consideration that counts in favor of it.​[23]​  But then it is far from clear how to both want something for a reason and want it because it is bad, so unclear that that the very possibility of perverse desiring would seem to be simply incoherent.  So a case against the two dogmas that rests upon the possibility of perverse desiring requires rather controversial assumptions.
Whether or not perverse desiring is possible—and for the remainder of this paper, I do not suppose that it is—desiring the bad may still be possible.  So, a plausible account of desiring the bad should simply jettison the requirement that agent who desire the bad must want D because they think that D is bad.  Stocker himself implicitly suggests such an account of desiring the bad in the following:
It will be sufficient to show that there are clear and unproblematic cases where what attracts us to do an act is attractive because it is (believed) bad or in spite of its being (believed) bad, where the act or feature is not attractive because or only because it or some other relevant act or feature is (believed) good.​[24]​
Crucially, note that Stocker implicitly suggests that SD1) is false if the object of desire is wanted in spite of—not because of—its badness.  So, the first dogma can be rejected if the following more modest thesis is correct:
DB3): An agent, A, can desire some object or event, D, even if i) A does not think that D is good (in some aspect) and ii) A thinks that D is bad (in some aspect or all-things considered)
Unlike DB2), DB3) leaves it open just why A wants D.  Clearly, however, if DB3) is true then SD1) false: it cannot both be the case that thinking that D is necessary for desiring it and possible to desire D without thinking that it is good.  Since DB3) is both consistent with Stocker’s discussion or desiring the bad and since it is inconsistent with the first dogma, I shall suppose that DB3) constitutes the bare minimum formulation of what is necessary to desire the bad.
While a fair bit of attention has been paid to the possibility of desiring the bad, less attention has been paid to a related phenomenon, what might be called intentionally pursuing the bad.  The following captures what is necessary for intentionally pursuing the bad:
IPB1): An agent, A, can intentionally perform some action, , even if i) A does not think that ing is good (in some aspect) and ii) A thinks that ing is bad (in some aspect or all-things considered)
In the same way that agents who desire the bad want D while thinking that D is bad and failing to think that it is good, agents who intentionally pursue the bad perform some action that they think is bad while failing to think that so acting is good.  Agents who intentionally pursue the bad by ing because they think that  is bad would act perversely, just as agents who want D because they think that D is bad desire perversely.
	There are important relationships between the theses articulated above: if SD1) is true then DB3) is false and vice versa; if SA1) is true then IPB1) is false and vice versa.  Alternatively, if desiring the bad is possible then the first dogma is false and if intentionally pursuing the bad is possible then the second dogma is false.  As such, any proponent of the two dogmas is committed to denying both DB3) and IPB1).  Since my present concern is with SA1), I shall focus primarily on arguments that intentionally pursuing the bad is not possible—that IPB1) must be false.  To that end, at least two different arguments—the Argument from Appeal and the Argument from Intelligibility—should be considered insofar as they suggest just that.

IV.	The Argument from Appeal

It is agreed almost across the board that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation—that intentional action is behavior apt for explanation in terms of goals and purposes and reasons.  On Donald Davidson’s influential account, explanations of intentional action—what Davidson calls “rationalizing explanations” and “rationalizations”—explain by revealing what it is that A saw, or thought she saw, about her -ing that appealed to her and led her to act.​[25]​ Ex hypothesi, rationalizing A’s ing requires revealing what it was about A’s ing that appealed to her and led her to act.  If all this is correct, then the following two Davidsonian theses can be taken for granted:
1)	A can  intentionally just in case A’s ing can be explained via a rationalizing explanation
2)	A’s ing can be explained via a rationalizing explanation only if there is something about her -ing that appeals to her and leads her to act
Proponents and opponents of the two dogmas alike can accept 1) and 2) as Tenenbaum seems to:
In a proper intentional explanation, the agent (or a third person) will be able to explain the point of engaging in such an activity...  On this view, a desire for an object as it typically appears in, for instance, an intentional explanation in the form of a belief-desire explanation must show what the agent found attractive in the choice of this action.​[26]​
Adequate explanations of action have a special task: to reveal “the point” of an action by revealing “what the agent found attractive in the choice of this action.”  If the point of an action just is the agent’s goal or purpose or reason for performing it, then Tenenbaum appears to accept 1).  And if ‘attractive’ and ‘appealing’ are synonymous, then he appears to accept 2).
	However, Tenenbaum accepts a further thesis about rationalizing explanations, that for an agent “will be able to explain what good he sees in the pursuit of this activity” if he is able to identify the point of that activity.  In other words, Tenenbaum appears to accept that rationalizing A’s ing is possible only if A thinks that ing is good (in some aspect).  Similarly, consider an influential thought-experiment offered by Quinn who considers an agent functionally disposed to turn on radios that he finds turned off.  Quinn argues that simply citing the psychological state that grounds that disposition does not rationalize the radio-turner-oner’s behavior:
…a psychological state whose salient function is to dispose an agent to act, is just not the kind of thing that can rationalize.  That I am psychologically set up to head in a certain way, cannot by itself rationalize my will’s going along with the setup.  For that I need the thought that the direction in which I am psychologically pointed leads to something good…​[27]​
Quinn clearly advocates the thesis that explanations of intentional action are rationalizations.  The radio-turner-oner’s behavior could be explained by citing an odd compulsion, for example, but that sort of explanation would fail to rationalize his behavior.  Apparently, only certain psychological states are capable of rationalizing behavior: a state akin to thinking that there is some good aspect about one’s action.  So, Quinn, like Tenenbaum, appears to accept the following further premise:
3)	If A does not think that her ing is good (in some aspect) then there is nothing about her -ing that could appeal to her and lead her to act
The conjunction of 1)-3) yields the following familiar thesis:
4)	Therefore, A can  intentionally only if A thinks that her ing is good (in some aspect)
1)-4) is the Argument from Appeal.  Since I take 1) for granted and since 2) is true by definition, 3) must be shown to be false if SA1) is to be resisted.
	 
V.	Moods, Emotions, and Rationalizing Explanations
One reason to doubt 3) is that Davidson rejects it.​[28]​  To demonstrate this, consider an objection offered by Rosalind Hursthouse.  Davidson claims that the cause of A’s ing is her primary reason—a paired desire to  and belief that by ing, she will .​[29]​  Hursthouse objects that Davidson cannot allow for the possibility of arational actions: genuinely intentional actions like fondly messing someone’s hair out of affection for her or destroying someone’s picture out of anger.​[30]​  An action is arational only if there is no “true description of the action of the form ‘ X did it (in order) to…’ or ‘ X was trying to…’ which will… involve, or imply, the ascription of a suitable belief.”​[31]​  Alternatively, arational actions are “explained solely by reference to desire… not to an appropriate belief.”​[32]​  So, if arational actions are possible, then not every action is caused by a primary reason.
A defense of Davidson begins by noting that Hursthouse’s claim that arational actions are “explained solely by reference to desire” is ambiguous.  Hursthouse could mean that citing A’s desire to  completely explains her ing arationally.  But this is implausible.  It is widely agreed among philosophers of action, first, that A can  intentionally only if she intends to do something, and second, that desiring is not the same thing as intending.​[33]​  If intentions must have a role to play in the production of intentional action, then intentional actions are not completely explained by desires.  More plausibly, Hursthouse could mean that citing A’s desire to  adequately or sufficiently explains her ing arationally.  We often regard putative explanations of familiar events as adequate while recognizing that they are incomplete: citing the rising floodwaters adequately explains the breaking of the levee, although a complete explanation would cite other events as well.  Explanations of arational actions might be like that: we might adequately explain A’s arational ing by solely citing her desire to , acknowledging that a full-blown explanation would include more.
	When arational actions are understood this way, Hursthouse’s objection dissolves: Davidson agrees that arational actions, so-defined, are possible. Indeed, he claims that simply citing your claustrophobia suffices to rationalize why you leave a party (because we know that claustrophobics tend to want to free themselves from confined spaces) and that citing my jealousy suffices to explain why I slash the tires of my rival (because we know that is the sort of thing a jealous man wants).​[34]​ Davidson only requires that rationalizations show “in essential outline” how to construct A’s primary reason, not that they must actually cite a desire-belief pair; actually mentioning primary reasons is “generally otiose.”​[35]​  So, the Davidsonian can perfectly well accept that arational actions are possible—that citing moods and emotions can suffice to rationalize action.
Rationalizations citing an agent’s moods and emotions can rationalize partly because at least some moods and emotions constitutively dispose their agents to feel and behave in certain ways: a person in the grip of jealousy may be disposed to scratch out the eyes of a picture in a way that she was not prior to the onset of her jealousy.  They sometimes preclude feelings and motivations; feeling vindictive mutes motivation to save a rival and shame or embarrassment probably weaken motivation to celebrate one’s accomplishments.  Finally, they can dispose their agents to have or lack certain cognitive states as well: agents who are proud have to believe that they have accomplished something and probably cannot believe that they are complete failures.
	Freud’s discussion of the constitutive effects of “melancholia” is suggestive for present purposes:
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings...​[36]​  
Velleman seems to have something similar in mind when he speaks of despair:
Suppose that I have suffered a profound disappointment that has case me into a mood of bitterness and despair.  In this mood, the very though of ameliorating my condition, or the condition of the world, strikes me as a sick delusion.  All attempts at constructive action seem absurd.  No more earnest efforts for me, I say to myself, no more worthy endeavors: to hell with it all.​[37]​
He continues:
Being in despair doesn’t prevent me from being moved to act, however.  I am moved to stay at home, refuse all invitations, keep the shades drawn and privately curse the day I was born.  I may even be moved to smash some crockery—though not in order to feel better, mind you, since trying to feel better seems just as ludicrous a project as any other.​[38]​
Now, Velleman insists that his despairing agent smashes things “because this seems like an utterly worthless act,” such that it is negative evaluations of actions that appeal to him and lead him to act.​[39]​ But since the opponent of the two dogmas need not suppose that perverse desiring and perverse actions are possible, she need not agree.  Instead, she may point out that both melancholia and despair, so understood, affect the cognitive and conative psychological economy of their victims in certain constitutive ways.  Both dispose their victims perform certain acts and have certain feelings: melancholia manifests itself in feelings of self-reproach and self-reviling which themselves are bound to manifest themselves in motives to harm or injure oneself while despairing agents tend to be motivated to perform actions that are futile by their own lights.  Both dispose their victims to fail to act and feel in other ways: victims of melancholia will be unmotivated to perform actions that are constructive by their own lights and despairing agents are unmotivated to perform what they believe are worthy endeavors.
	The proponent of the two dogmas may offer a different objection, however.  Freud and Velleman seem to define ‘melancholia’ and ‘despair’ in such a way that ensures the two dogmas are false, but the proponent of the two dogmas can deny that such moods are possible.  This need not commit her to denying that there is such a thing as depression, for example, only that depression should not be understood as melancholia or despair, so defined.​[40]​ However, it seems to me that at least some people that we would naturally describe as “depressed” do seem to suffer from melancholia or despair.  More precisely, the clinical definition of a “Major Depressive Episode” suggests that melancholia and despair, so-defined, are actual mood-disorders and not merely philosophers’ constructions.​[41]​ Persons suffering from a major depressive episode suffer from a number of possible symptoms for at least a two-week period that are not the effects of either substance abuse, a general medical condition, or bereavement.  They must suffer from either a depressed mood for most of the day and nearly every day or else from the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities, if not both.  In addition, they must suffer from some combination of the following symptoms: significant weight loss or gain when not dieting or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day; insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day; psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day; fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day; feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilty nearly every day; diminished ability to think or concentrate or indecisiveness nearly every day; recurrent thoughts about death (not just a fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation with or without a specific plan or a suicide attempt.  Admittedly, not everyone suffering from a major depressive episode will also suffer from melancholia or despair, but some ways of suffering from a major depressive episode will meet the constitutive criteria for suffering from one or the other.  So, if major depressive episodes are possible—and surely they are—then melancholia and despair also seem possible.​[42]​
My argument is that a dilemma awaits proponents of 3) of the Argument from Appeal.  It is constitutive of moods like melancholia and depression and despair that agents in their grip are not motivated to perform actions that they believe are worthwhile or constructive or otherwise good (in some aspect).  Thus, acting out of melancholia or depression or despair precludes finding that action appealing because of its believed goodness and acting on that basis.  To put the point another way, given their constitutive effects, no rationalizing explanation can cite both cite melancholia or depression or despair, on the one hand, and an agent’s belief that her action is good (in some aspect): the former precludes the latter and vice versa.  So, either moods like melancholia, depression, and despair cannot really rationalize action—which seems implausible—or 3) of the Argument from Appeal is false.
Consider a similar dilemma for proponents of the following crude variety of psychological egoism:
(PE): Necessarily, an agent, A, can intentionally perform some action, , only if A thinks that ing is in her self-interest
One consequence of (PE) is that it precludes the possibility of acting out of love.  Whatever else is true of love, it constitutively disposes the lover to suppose that her beloved is intrinsically worthy of concern in and of her own right.​[43]​  If (PE) is true then it would be impossible to act out of love since all actions are explained at least partly by self-interest, a concern that is surely absent from at least some cases in which persons act out of love.  So either love cannot really rationalize action—which seems implausible—or (PE) is false.  Insisting upon the truth of (PE) amounts to failing to appreciate love in terms of its constitutive effects on the lover.  Similarly, to insist upon the truth of 3) of the Argument from Appeal is to fail to appreciate other moods and emotions in terms of their constitutive effects on their victim.
	Again, 3) of the Argument from Appeal implies that moods like melancholia and depression and despair cannot adequately rationalize intentional action.  But once accepts the Davidsonian thought moods and emotions generally have that explanatory power, that result should appear untoward.  So, accepting a Davidsonian account of rationalizing explanation actually speaks against 3) while denying that Davidsonian account yields counterintuitive implications concerning the explanatory power of moods and emotions.  Thus, I submit, the Argument from Appeal fails.  But even if the Argument from Appeal does not vindicate SA1), another related argument promises to.

VI.	The Argument from Intelligibility 
The above discussion suggests that if Velleman’s crockery-smasher really acts out of despair then cannot really think that smashing crockery is good (in some aspect).  One obvious response on behalf of the proponent of the two dogmas is to deny that Velleman’s crockery-smasher acts intentionally.  The proponent of SA1) need not deny that anger can cause someone to punch a hole in the wall or that despair can cause someone to smash crockery absent any thought that such behavior is good (in some aspect).  But she must deny that his behavior is intentional action.  
This denial need not be ad hoc.  Again, I take for granted that the explanation of intentional action is a species of teleological explanation.  I submit that Anscombe agrees in the following famous passage:
‘Evil be thou my good’ is often thought to be senseless in some way.  Now all that concerns us here is that ‘What’s the good of it?’ is something that can be asked until a desirability characterization has been reached and made intelligible.  If then the answer to this question is ‘The good of it is that it’s bad,’ this need not be unintelligible; one can go on to say ‘And what is the good of its being bad?’ to which the answer might be condemnation of good as impotent, slavish, and inglorious.  Then the good of making evil my good is my intact liberty in the unsubmissiveness of my will.  Bonnum est multiplex: good is multiform, and all that is required for our concept of ‘wanting’ is that a man should see what he wants under the aspect of some good.”​[44]​
Desirability characterizations are supposed to put a stop to questions like “What's the good of it?” and its kin.  Presumably, a desirability characterization reveals just what an agent’s goal or purpose or reason for acting is.  But not just any answer will do; the answer must make the object of the desirability characterization intelligible according to Anscombe and not just any answer is intelligible.  For example, an agent who “explains” why he hunts out all the green books in his house and spreads them out on his roof by suggesting that “I just thought I would” fails to provide both an intelligible desirability characterization of what he does.​[45]​  By contrast, if he notes that spreading out his books is fun or pleasant then he does provide an intelligible desirability characterization.​[46]​
The Davidsonian has reason to pay attention to Anscombe here.  Another Davidsonian thesis is that explaining intentional action amounts to radically interpreting the behavior of an agent and that radical interpretation is not possible unless we also attribute to that agent a host of other propositional attitudes and intentional states—including other beliefs, desires, intentions, decision, hopes, fears, and such—that are consistent with that action.​[47]​ Since the Davidsonian already insists that rationalizing behavior involves intelligibly interpreting that behavior against the backdrop of a series of propositional attitudes, there is an argument that the Davidsonian who accepts 1) below should also accept 2):
1)	A can  intentionally just in case A’s ing can be explained via a rationalizing explanation
2)	A’s ing can be explained via a rationalizing explanation only if A’s ing can be rationalized intelligibly
The question, then, is what is required for a rationalizing explanation to qualify as intelligible.  Anscombe’s closing remarks about the connection between wanting and thinking good suggests that she endorses the following further premise:
3)	A’s ing can be rationalized intelligibly only if A thinks that her ing is good (in some aspect)
The conjunction of 1)-3) yields the following familiar thesis:
4)	Therefore, A can  intentionally only if A thinks that her ing is good (in some aspect)
1)-4) just is the Argument from Intelligibility and it too yields SA1) as its conclusion.
	At least some proponents of SA1) clearly accept something like 3) of the Argument from Intelligibility.  Consider Tenenbaum’s remarks about desires that play a role in explanations of intentional action:
…if the desire is not for something that the agent conceives to be good, we would not know what point the agent could see in such an action, and we would therefore not have made the agent intelligible.​[48]​
Elsewhere, he insists that:
Not just any sort of aim can be an intelligible aim… to say that… desire can be identified with conceiving something as good is at least to say that anything that is aimed at in action must be an intelligible aim.​[49]​
Just as the man who spreads out green books on his roof fails to offer an intelligible aim by noting that he “just thought that he would,” perhaps the crockery smasher has not yet offered an intelligible aim simply by citing his anger as the cause of what he does.  By contrast, an agent who can specify what he thinks is good about spreading out his books surely does reveal an intelligible aim fit for rationalizing explanation.  
Raz too appears committed to 3):
...typical intentional actions are actions about which their agents have a story to tell (i.e., actions manifesting an internal viewpoint about what one is doing, or is about to do),  a story that explains why one acted as one did.  Moreover, and this point is crucial, the explanation makes intelligible not only why the action happened; it makes it intelligible as an action chosen... the “story” is of what the agent took to be facts which show the act to be good and which therefore constitute a reason for its performance...​[50]​
If a rationalization makes an the choice to perform an action intelligible by revealing what it was about that action that its agent took to be good, then an explanation rationalizes only if it reveals what is was about that action that its agent took to be good.  But that is just to say that A’s ing can be explained intelligibly only if A thinks that her ing is good (in some aspect).
	It is worth noting that proponents of the two dogmas do not speak uniformly of just what rationalizations must make intelligible: Anscombe speaks of a intelligibility conferring desirability characterizations, Tenenbaum of intelligible aims and agents, and Raz of intelligible choices to act.  No matter; so long as there is some link between intelligibility and thinking that an action is good, the proponent of the two dogmas has an argument for SA1).  What remains to be established is just why 3) of the Argument from Intelligibility should be accepted.
	
VII.	Intelligibility and Rationalizing Explanation
Some care should be taken to avoid a merely verbal dispute.  Clearly, ‘good’ as it appears in 3) of the Argument from Intelligibility is not simply synonymous with ‘goal’ or ‘purpose.’  If it were, opponents of the two dogmas could endorse Anscombe’s reasoning that it is “fair nonsense” to claim that one wants a pin while denying that one wants it for anything:
To say “I merely want this” without any [desirability] characterization is to deprive the word of sense; if he insists on ‘having’ the thing, we want to know what “having” amounts to.​[51]​
If Anscombe is right, we never simply want D tout court; instead, we always want D for something.  But that only shows that desires are correlated with goals or aims or purposes.​[52]​ It would not follow that desiring or intentionally pursuing the bad are impossible: an agent who explains that she mutilates herself for the sake of suffering has identified her purpose in the same way that someone who explains that he wants turn on clock radios for his amusement has.  Clearly, then, 3) invokes ‘good’ in some more substantive sense that is supposed to preclude the possibility of intentionally pursuing the bad.
	Raz suggests that there is no substantive sense in which intentionally pursuing the bad could be rationalized intelligibly.  Raz complains that anyone who thinks that intentionally pursuing the bad is possible is thereby:
…committed to the availability of an explanation of how it is that non-good making qualities make an action eligible.  I find it difficult to imagine such an explanation.​[53]​ 
For Raz, an action is eligible just in case there is some fact about the action that makes the choice to perform that action intelligible from the point of view of the acting agent.​[54]​  So, Raz’s complaint can be restated as follows:
[The opponent of 3) is] committed to the availability of an explanation of how it is that non-good making qualities make the choice to perform an action intelligible from the point of view of the acting agent.  I find it difficult to imagine such an explanation.
Raz’s complaint amounts to a challenge: explain what could make the choice to  intelligible from A’s point of view besides some “good making quality.”  Presumably, failing to rise to this challenge amounts to implicitly conceding that 3) is correct.  By contrast, answering this challenge amounts to showing that 3) is false: if the choice to intentionally pursue the bad is ever intelligible, then 3) is false.
One gets the sense that ‘intelligible’ is doing an awful lot of work here.  In lieu of simply stipulating some definition, consider what Tenenbaum says about intelligibility:
We can understand that an agent might find revenge worth pursuing, and we can find intelligible an agent who would leave much behind for the sake of avenging her brother (even if we do not feel inclined to pursue revenge ourselves) in a way that we cannot find an agent who dedicates his life to howling to the moon intelligible.  …insofar as an aim is intelligible, we must be capable of grasping how someone could see the point of pursuing this aim despite its flaws.​[55]​
I am broadly sympathetic with what Tenenbaum says here.  Since Raz’s challenge is issued in terms of choices to act, consider the following attempt to capture Tenenbaum’s remarks:
(I): A’s choice to perform some action, , is intelligible if B can grasp how A could see the point of ing
There are some obscurities here.  It is an open question who and how many persons must be able to grasp how someone else could see the point—would it suffice if a single sociopath or a group of psychotics could?  Is a choice to act intelligible quite generally if only one other person can grasp the point?  For that matter, it is not altogether clear what is necessary to “grasp” or “see” the point: is it simply a matter of being in some cognitive state?  Or does grasping the point require some related motivation to act as well?  Whatever else “grasping” the point requires, it surely involves an exercise of the imagination and trying to imagine what another person would choose to do—of taking up their point of view, as Raz suggests.  Taking up another person’s point of view in turn requires, inter alia, approximating at least some of her propositional attitudes. The idea is that for me to find your choice to act intelligible, I must think that I too could make that choice if I found myself in similar circumstances as you, thought roughly as you do, cared and valued roughly as you do, and so forth.  And I take it that a choice to act is intelligible if something like this imaginative exercise is successful. 
If A thinks that she could choose as B does then she must think, roughly, that she would so choose in some relevant nearby possible world.  If so, then the following is a plausible extension of (I):
(I*): A’s choice to perform some action, , is intelligible if B believes, roughly, that there is some nearby possible world in which a counterpart of B, B*, approximates A’s circumstances, epistemic condition, and intentional states and that B* chooses to ​[56]​
Again, it is an open question whether or not proponents of the two dogmas would accept (I) or (I*) and worries about engaging in a merely verbal dispute loom large.  But (I*) is not clearly implausible and reasonably faithful to Tenenbaum and Raz’s remarks about intelligibility.  But if (I*) is correct, then Raz’s challenge can be met.  
To illustrate, consider a particularly tragic example borrowed from a real-life case study.  Carla is a fourteen year-old woman being treated for depression and anorexia who revealed to her therapist that she had been mutilating herself for at least three months, primarily by cutting herself on her arms and breasts.​[57]​  By her own account, she targets those areas for mutilation because they are especially sensitive and because she can get a lot of pain with comparatively little damage.  Her behavior is prompted, at least in part, by her parent’s marital discord.  But while Carla is angry with them, she does not want to hurt her parents any further; her father had already developed a stutter and her mother became withdrawn.  Indeed, when asked if anyone knew of her behavior, she replied: “That would defeat the whole purpose.  It would hurt both my parents to find out I do this.”​[58]​  It might be thought that, given Carla’s circumstances, she must be cutting in order to express anger that she cannot express any other way.  By her own lights, there might be something good about that.  But her testimony suggests that she thinks otherwise.
Some comments about self-mutilating behavior are appropriate to forestall confusion.   First, while self-mutilating behavior is often correlated with obsessive-compulsive disorder or anxiety or depression, not every agent who engages in self-mutilating behavior also suffers from any particular distinct mental illness.  Relatedly, it is a mistake to suppose that all self-mutilators harm themselves for the same reason; it might function as an expression of anger or anxiety that cannot otherwise be expressed; it may be the result of external pressures and signal that the patient is residing in an unhealthy environment; it may function as a “suicide replacement”; it may serve as a means for a patient to distinguish herself from others.​[59]​  Case studies suggest that self-mutilation is sometimes used to deter sexual assault​[60]​ or to reinforce the ability to suffer great pains.​[61]​ There are several competing functional models explaining self-mutilating behavior and there is no consensus that any one model suggests the explanation.  Third, at least some self-mutilators are dissociative, such that they suffer from a temporary alternation of the normally integrative functions of consciousness, but others are not; some report that they do not feel pain during self-mutilation while others do.​[62]​  Fourth, while at least some self-mutilators consciously and deliberately seek pain for its own sake, others seek it instrumentally.​[63]​  Carla appears to fall into the former category: she is a non-dissociative, non-amnesia-inducing, consciously pain-seeking self-mutilator.​[64]​
It is, perhaps, easy to understand why someone would mutilate themselves, supposing that they thought that there was something good to be derived from doing so; hence the typical assumption that cutters must get some relief from their behavior, that they enjoy their pain in some sense, and so forth.  Carla’s case is puzzling precisely because she does not claim that she acts for those reasons.  Admittedly, another person, as they are now, might fail to believe that they could act as Carla does—that they too would choose to mutilate themselves in any circumstances.  However, if (I*) is correct, then determining whether or not Carla’s choice to mutilate herself is intelligible requires more than that; it requires taking up Carla’s point of view and imagining oneself in her circumstances, epistemic condition, and intentional states.  This would require imagining that one is the child of a broken marriage living in a home ruled by passive-aggressive marital discord, suffering from fairly severe depression and an eating disorder, loving one’s parents while feeling unable to resolve their discord, believing that revealing the effects of one’s self-mutilation would only make things worse, compulsively wanting to feel pain for its own sake, and so forth.  Individual readers will have to decide for themselves, but armed with the sort of information required by (I*) it is not implausible to suppose that one could make that choice having taken up Carla’s point of view.  At least, it is unclear where the confidence comes from that there is no possible world in which one, similarly situated, would choose to mutilate themselves.
In fact, insisting that Carla really does think that there is something good about mutilating herself does not make her more intelligible but less so.  As noted above, the project of rationalizing and the behavior of other persons calls for interpreting their behavior consistent with their other propositional attitudes and intentional states.  But the belief that there is something good about what she does is not consistent with Carla’s other propositional attitudes and intentional states given what else we know about her.  Demanding that Carla really thinks that her self-mutilating behavior is good because it expresses her anger and frustration to her parents conflicts with her genuine concern for not hurting them; to suppose that she really thinks that her pain is good or deserved conflicts with her continued frustration after cutting herself, and so forth.  In short, the supposition that Carla thinks that mutilating herself is good (in some aspect) does not cohere well with other facts about her circumstances, epistemic situation, and intentional states and that is a reason to refrain from interpreting her as such.
	Three consequences of all this should be made explicit.  First, it appears that Raz’s challenge has been met. Considering the relevant facts about Carla’s circumstances, epistemic situation, and intentional states are considered, then it seems possible to imagine making the same choice that Carla makes if similarly situated. But given (I*), it follows that Carla’s choice to act is intelligible from her point of view.  The sort of explanation that Raz calls for is a psychological explanation, one that reveals—in broad strokes, anyway—how non-good making qualities could make the choice to perform an action intelligible from the point of view of the acting agent.
Second, and relatedly, since Raz’s Challenge is met, 3) of the Argument from Intelligibility is false: Carla’s self-mutilating behavior can be rationalized intelligibly even though she does not think that there is anything good about what she does.  Here too, facts about her circumstances, epistemic situation, and intentional states supply or suggest the means to intelligibly rationalize her behavior even absent any thought that behavior is good (in some aspect). As noted above, at least some adequate rationalizations explain by citing the acting agent’s moods and emotions.  If those moods and emotions also constitutively prelude thinking that one’s behavior is good (in some aspect) then it is not the case that action can be rationalized intelligibly only if the acting agent thinks that her action is good (in some aspect).  Thus, 3) of the Argument from Intelligibility is false.
Third, reflection on intelligibility and rationalizing explanation suggests not just that the Argument from Intelligibility is unsound but that the two dogmas are false.  Explaining just why requires a bit of discussion.

VIII.	Leaving the Two Dogmas Behind
Carla appears to deny that she thinks that there is anything good about her self-mutilating behavior.  But if her behavior can be intelligibly rationalized—and the argument of the above section suggests that it can—then her behavior qualifies as intentional action.  As such, Carla appears to intentionally pursue the bad.  But the first dogma must be false if intentionally pursuing the bad is possible.  Since the truth of IPB) implies that SA1) is false, SA1) is false if Carla’s behavior is possible so understood.
Again, proponents of the two dogmas are bound to be unimpressed with controversial counter-examples.  But the point is quite general generally.  A working assumption thus far is that intentional action is behavior that can be explained via a rationalizing explanation.  Arguments from earlier sections suggest, first, that moods and emotions can generally rationalize an agent’s action, that some of those moods and emotions preclude thinking that the action is good (in some aspect), and that those moods and emotions can be part of an explanation that reveals why an agent found the choice to perform some otherwise unintelligible action such that her choice to act is itself intelligible.  These three theses together imply moods and emotions can intelligibly rationalize behavior absent any belief that the behavior is good (in some aspect).  But if behavior can be so rationalized, then it counts as intentional action.  And if it is possible to  intentionally while failing to think that ing is good (in some aspect) then SA1) is false.
Things get worse for proponents of the two dogmas.  A strong case can be made that the first dogma is false if the second dogma is.  Making that case depends upon the following:
D): If A s intentionally, then it must literally be the case that A wants to 
If D) is correct, then an agent who intentionally draws to a straight flush must literally want to draw to a straight flush and an agent who intentionally smashes crockery must literally want to smash crockery. The argument for D) rests partly on the observation that it is linguistically strained and awkward to assert both that ‘A ed intentionally’ and that ‘A literally did not want to .’  Admittedly, we do sometimes claim that we don’t want to perform the very actions that we are now performing, especially when they are rather undesirable or tiresome: I might declare that “I don’t want to be doing this!” as put this paper through yet another tortured draft.  But I take it that those assertions are not literally true—that I do not literally lack any desire to revise this paper yet again.  In fact, there is an argument that D) must be correct.  If some A’s ing can be rationalized then there must be something about her ing that appeals to her and led her to act.  But if ing appealed to A, then it must be the case that A has some desire to ; if A literally had no desire to  then nothing about ing could appeal to her and lead her to act.  To deny D) is to allow that there are intentional actions that cannot be teleologically explained.
	D) should not be confused with two comparatively controversial theses.  First, D) is not identical to a thesis Michael Bratman dubs “the simple view”—the thesis that A can  intentionally only if she intends to .​[65]​  Many philosophers, including Bratman, reject the simple view, however.  Whether the simple view is correct or not is irrelevant for present purposes, since D) only requires that agents who  intentionally want to  and not that they intend to .   Second, D) is not identical to the so-called Humean theory of motivation.  On Michael Smith’s authoritative account, the Humean theory implies that “R at t constitutes a motivating reason of agent A to  iff there is some  such that R at t consists of a desire of A to  and a belief that were he to  he would .”​[66]​  However, the Humean theory only demands that an acting agent has some desire that explains her ing, not that she must desire to ; on Smith’s schema, it is possible that  and  do not refer to the same event.  Further, some philosophers who reject the Humean theory nonetheless accept D)—that is, they deny that A has a motivating reason to  only if A has the requisite desire and belief pair but they allow that any agent who s intentionally must want to .​[67]​  Finally, note that the Humean insists that desires are, but beliefs are not, conative states.​[68]​  By contrast, some non-Humeans claim that certain beliefs are conative and that those motivating beliefs are a kind of desire.​[69]​  D) is silent about whether or not any beliefs are also desires.  Thus, the present argument against the two dogmas does not turn on the Humean theory.
	If it is possible—as I have suggested—to  intentionally while failing to think that ing is good (in some aspect) and if D) is true, then SD1) must also be false.  SD1) would have to be false because any agent who s while failing to think that ing is good (in some aspect) would also want to  while failing to think that ing is good.  So, if D) is true, then SD1) is false if SA1) is. The two dogmas of moral psychology are both best jettisoned.

IX.	Conclusion
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